°Gewalt
A very Long Sunday discussion on Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence”, and a reminder of Benjamin’s signature text. Contributions so far from Marc Lombardo on language, jurisprudence and the divine, Alain on ‘pure means’, Jodi Dean on ‘divine violence’, Adam Kotsko on the ‘force of law’, Kenneth Rufo on the aura of Benjamin and, most recently, my own scattered notes written during a very short flight home.
Updates: Jon on Benjamin and the party-form, and Paul Passavant puts Michel up against Walter.
I think I felt inclined to step away from a discussion of the messianic, the elegant weight of Derrida’s reading, and perhaps too the aura of Benjamin’s own writings. Also, to step aside from reiterating what I’ve already written about Benjamin in relation to the state of emergency and borders - the gist of which can be gleaned from here and here - and take it a little further along. Perhaps some of the remarks will remain obscure for that reason, but I’m hoping that the the comments about work contracts (and ‘Workchoices’) might incline it otherwise.
re; Long Sunday chat on violence
Benjamin’s concepts of violence and law, however moving and grandiose, are–like most postmod writing on law and ethics– dogmatic and clerical–obsolete. There seems to be a transcendent if not rabbinical aspect to all of this.
There are no innate Justice universals–or if there are, Benjamin doesn’t really argue for their existence (subsistence?), or demonstrate their ontological status–if such an argument would even be viable. And while I realize that such reductionism and skepticism is not popular with the LS types, it’s quite obvious the metaphysical deck has been loaded–with perhaps Plato the dealer. Does one talk about the actions, or the supposed instincts, sadistic desires, transgressions, etc,.? Given a non-platonic and non-metaphysical mind, then one must do some sort of instinct/will analysis or, alas behaviorism–unless some one can locate psycho-neurologists who are capable of providing a genetic/biochemical account of violent and deviant behavior.
Freuds’ Civilization and Its Discontents and perhaps the early writings of Wilhelm Reich offer some more relevant, empirical explanations for fascist behavior; as does well, Pavlov.
Comrade [December 1, 2005 @ 2:12 am]
Um, ok. Well, I guess we disagree, on quite a bit. Not least Benjamin.
Though, I do have a liking for Civilisation and its Discontents, but I don’t think I’d read it as “providing an empirical explanation”.
s0metim3s [December 1, 2005 @ 11:55 pm]
So, given your disagreement and seeming opposition to empiricism (CAID does feature case studies/anthro. type of information), you then do uphold an ontology which includes transcendent universals such as “Justice”? It is my contention that any view of ethics, intention, justice, “evil” is predicated on well, ontology, for lack of a better word. Catholics have a much different view of evil than marxists do, and so on. Benjamin, with all the all references to “divine” violence etc. seems to be in the theological camp ( I also recall reading he was influenced by Kierkegaard). As a materialist I do not think there are grounds for theological ethics, or platonic ethics–unless the Justice universal is construed as a feature/attribute of our brain and thinking: fascism is then a type of deviancy (horrible nonetheless) rather than some spiritual manifestation. And the entire intention question has not really been dealt with at all –could large numbers of Germans have been sort of led by instinct or unconsciously into joining or supporting the brownshirts, or was this it a reasoned choice. . It gets rather ugly when you look at in somewhat biological terms, but that does not mean the biological and empirical should be dismissed out of hand.
Comrade [December 2, 2005 @ 3:14 am]
I’m not sure if biology can be substituted for the idea of, say, justice, as if the former is not also a kind of universalisation. Whose very attempt at universalisation is inherent in any notion of, say, “deviancy”.
But thanks for stopping by.
s0metim3s [December 3, 2005 @ 11:00 am]
It’s a bit easier to point to say a human stomach, and really to hunger, than it is to “justice”. They are not two equivalent posits. Justice names something quite different than what “stomach” names. . What is that something? A thought? A class? A set of definitions? An abstract entity? I know this might all sound sort of vague, but its really never addressed. Justice should not be decided by popular vote, but a philosopher king –or psychologist–might also fail to provide some correct definition. “Justice” is a word which describes the actions that are just (does that mean correct, or proper or something else)–for you are speaking of actions not merely states of mind or attitudes. . .
Comrade [December 3, 2005 @ 11:59 am]
I might be getting a little confused here. Can you show me the comments of mine about justice that you’re disagreeing with?
s0metim3s [December 3, 2005 @ 12:13 pm]
you said this: “I ’m not sure if biology can be substituted for the idea of, say, justice, as if the former is not also a kind of universalisation.”
You seem to imply, though I am not sure, that biology and justice are both universals, which is sort of correct; but the biology universal is referring to a large class of objects–animals, plants, etc.– that do exist and can be pointed to etc. Justice does not function at all like that, semantically speaking. In fact it doesn’t seem to have any easily specified type of function other than “a term for those acts which certain humans approve of”–unless, perhaps, you are willing to take a metaphysical leap of faith and say that the Justice refers to some mental/metaphysical object as, say, “triangle” does. Then when some just act is being done–say the jury and then judge delivers the verdict on, eh, Scotty Peterson’s guilt–that act is in harmony with or partakes of, that mental universal which we term Justice. It almost seems we are forced into some platonic view–, or must say justice is a matter of consensus, subject to modifcation, relative to some extent etc.. If so, then in a few hundred years Scotty Peterson’ s act of murdering his wife might be just–or the nazis?
Comrade [December 3, 2005 @ 12:55 pm]
That was a response to the structure of your argument, since, instead of ‘justice’ you want to talk about ‘biology’ - and do so with recourse to concepts like “deviancy” which are as redolent of universalism as any notion of justice has been.
It was not a suggestion by me that I would prefer to talk about justice, since I haven’t on this occasion. Though, you could take a moment, go back to the mainpage, and search this weblog for ‘justice’. This might give you a better idea of what I think of a term I rarely use, and mostly to criticise.
Anyway, we all hunger for many things, not always food. You seem to hunger for debate, of a kind that doesn’t quite engage with the other person. Of such debates, I’ve had my fill.
s0metim3s [December 3, 2005 @ 1:07 pm]
hey there,
Very eloquent, especially on that hunger bit.
I like your post at Long Sunday, and I’m glad you decided not to emphasize Derrida and messianism, as I don’t know what to do with either. One question: what do you mean when you say “work contract”? Do you mean the very basic (forced) agreement between employed and employed (I’ll show and work, you will pay me), or something more specific? The former doesn’t have to entail any kind of legal aspects but could be underwritten by a balance of power to retaliate on the other. Actually, come to think of it, I think the legal aspects are mostly just different avenues and specific modes for retaliation. Hmm. I’ll have to think more about all this.
Lastly, I commented something at Long Sunday about this but it might not appear for a bit. Someone named Old commented that they like how you link the rhetoric of rights with statist practices. I do too, but I think I’m not as clear on how that link operates. (I think this is some of you and Thiago’s disagreements as well.) (Also, does that comment seem a fair one to you on your writing, on the link between rhetoric and statism?) I get the sense that for you a certain mode of speech (right talk) partially (re)produces a certain mode of social organization today, and I agree, but I also get a sense that for you it will always do so (always may be overstated, but I hope the point is still clear). Is that a fair characterization? (I want to understand better, in part because I can’t always tell if I disagree or don’t understand or both.)
take care,
Nate
Nate [December 3, 2005 @ 6:12 pm]
I like discussions on the messianic, which are, after all, discussions of teleology and eschatology, but they can obscure a lot.
I mean contracts from the very specific employment contract (formal or informal, but the discussion of ‘Workchoices’ is obviously about written law) to the ’social contract’.
I guess the basic question of rights is this: ‘By what right?’ Who or what grants this right? Where are rights?
In acceding to the state’s capacity to grant rights, one also concedes that it has the right to remove rights on certain occasions. But my dissatisfaction with rights politics has been a longstanding one. If anything, as I’ve tried to think my way around it, I’m more not less convinced that it doesn’t offer a politics I’m interested in pursuing.
The US concept of ‘inalienable rights’ is so theocratic, and so thoroughly dependant on a certain individuation, that I have difficulty getting my head around it. I live in a country that was established as a penal colony. The working principle of “Don’t believe you have rights” seems like more than sound advice to me. It focusses one’s attention on the world rather than the heavens.
On comments, here and at LS, they’ve been moved to moderation. I’m reluctant to talk about “trolls”, but crazed stalkers make for more work than I’m willing to do. Below, is “comrade’s'’ most recent comment:
s0metim3s [December 3, 2005 @ 9:54 pm]
hey Angela,
Right, well that settles the “moderate or not” question for me. Ugh. Sorry, and thanks.
Regarding rights and all that, thanks much for clarifying. The Australia penal colony and don’t assume you have rights is very interesting. I think the relative disconnect between is partially connected to that. The inalienable rights thing is a theological idea, but one that I’m very much at home with here, and one which makes me quite interest in the ‘construct heaven on earth’ types of immanent theologies. Since I’m a conciliatory sort I want to say that perhps one can arrive at similar places via these different perspectives (this is why I like Hardt and Rorty, they both are always saying “we don’t really disagree…” which is both an impulse and conversational power play that speaks to me). A rights-less person acts and is acted upon in varied modes of gewalt (right?). A person with rights that are secured by an internal divinity, and whose rights are neither greater nor less than those of any one elses, also acts and is acted upon in varied modes of gewalt. You may disagree, though, and I’d love to hear more if you have time, I find all of this helps me get my head clear.
I think maybe the move I’m interested in making is something like an implied distinction between “rights” and “actually-existing rights politics”. I don’t like the latter. I’m not even committed to the former, but the distinction is linked to a hope that every speech act involving the former might not automatically turn into the latter. Put differently, it’s a hope that I can have conversations with people, people I know who talk in terms of rights, that may divert them from “actually-existing rights politics” without having to start from the ground up and undermine their vocabulary of rights. I get the impression that for you the needed overhaul is much more thoroughgoing, reaching down to a number of problematic concepts and categories. Is that a fair characterization?
I hope all’s well.
take care,
Nate
Nate [December 4, 2005 @ 3:59 am]
The “don’t believe you have rights” thing comes from, as I’m told, various feminist perspectives in Italy. But, I guess it speaks to me for the particular reasons I mentioned, and likely some others I haven’t yet thought about.
But, honestly, not everything can be conciliated or should be. The pressure to agree, or worse, unite, isn’t better if it’s undertaken cynically - ie., without actually believing that it is possible or the aim. Or, is it the aim?
Because for all of Rorty’s and Hardt’s talk about difference, they both proffer some heavy liberalism and Leninism respectively. Pragmatism and diplomacy is not simply a neutral means for ends which might be distinguished from them, whatever people say. They already suppose a certain kind of relationship toward people (pragma = things), statecraft, a presumed idiocy of ‘the masses’ and one’s manipulation of them.
And, yes, I do think the discussion about rights is a kind of node of various problems, including the very notion of politics as organised around the figure of ‘man’.
s0metim3s [December 4, 2005 @ 9:19 am]
hi Angela,
I may have been unclear. I meant to say that I think I have a conciliatory temperment, and so I’m attracted to a certain theoretical conciliatory mode in H and R. I do realize that there can be a nefarious cast to this as well, a la Leninists and liberals, and worry about it, about turning into one of those.
take care,
Nate
Nate [December 4, 2005 @ 6:44 pm]